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ABSTRACT 
Focusing on the tension between public values and private property 
rights in the area of U.S. water law, the Article focuses on a case 
arising from the longest drought in California’s history. The Article 
examines when public values espoused by the regulator should curtail 
private exercise of often long-held private water rights. The Article 
argues that, as usufructuary water rights, water belongs to the public, 
which should emphatically uphold its right to regulate what happens 
to its resource, even when in the hands of private rights-holders, 
during a public emergency such as a devastating drought. Such issues 
have historically arisen to great contention in western states, and they 
are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between approximately 2011 and 2017, California experienced 
its worst drought in 1,200 years.1 California produces in excess of 400 
farm products that constitute roughly one-tenth of the nation’s total 
agricultural output, making California the country’s largest 
agricultural producer and exporter.2 As a result of the drought, at least 
102 million trees died in California’s forests, millions more were 
moribund, and they increased the risk of wildfires.3 The drought also 
 
 1. Daniel Griffin & Kevin J. Anchukaitis, How Unusual Is the 2012–2014 
California Drought?, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 9017, 9017 (2014) (estimating 
2014 as the worst year of drought in the state of California in the last 1,200 years); see 
Kyle Kim & Thomas Suh Lauder, 275 Drought Maps Show Deep Drought and Deep 
Recovery, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/ 
lanow/la-me-g-california-drought-map-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/5RWF-
XX87] (showing a drought monitor that was last clear in December 2011 with a steady 
recovery by 2017). While a previous paper I wrote on a related subject begins 
similarly, the current paper focuses on California in more detail and expands upon the 
insights of the previous paper. See generally Duane Rudolph, Why Prior 
Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 348 (2015). 
 2. See PAC. INST., IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S ONGOING DROUGHT: 
AGRICULTURE 1 (2015).  
 3. Press Release, USDA OFFICE OF COMMC’N., New Aerial Survey Identifies 
More Than 100 Million Dead Trees in California (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.fs.fed.us/news/releases/new-aerial-survey-identifies-more-100-million-
dead-trees-california [https://perma.cc/PZD3-5RKT]. 
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affected animal migrations and hibernations, and it increased contact 
between humans and wild animals in search of food and water.4 Fish 
stocks were imperiled and waterfowl were forced to respond to the 
drought as well.5 The drought affected agriculture and increased 
groundwater pumping,6 and as a result, water conservation measures 
were put into place.7 At the end of the drought, the governor of 
California signed two bills into law that made water-conservation 
measures permanent.8 “We have efficiency goals for energy and cars,” 
the governor stated, “and now we have them for water.”9 
California is one of ten states following a hybrid approach to 
water rights.10 Most states, especially in the east, where water is more 
abundant, have adopted the riparian doctrine, which apportions water 
based on title to land that is contiguous to the water source, and the 
riparian doctrine requires reasonable use of contiguous water.11 Where 
water is scarcer and needs to be transported outside the basin, as in a 
number of western states, the prior appropriation doctrine holds sway, 
and it privileges water access based on the ancestry of the claim to the 
water, while requiring beneficial use of water diverted from its 
 
 4. See Jami Smith, Drought Hurting Animals, Plants, CAL. ACAD. OF SCI. 
(Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.calacademy.org/explore-science/drought-hurting-
animals-plants [https://perma.cc/L2W3-6VYH]. 
 5. See id.; Jay Lund et al., Lessons from California’s 2012–2016 Drought, 
144(10) J. OF WATER RES. PLAN. & MGMT. 10 (2018).   
 6. See PAC. INST., supra note 2, at 2; Lund et al., supra note 5, at 10.  
 7. See Ian Lovett, California Approves Forceful Steps Amid Drought, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/us/forceful-steps-amid-
a-severe-drought.html [https://perma.cc/63V2-UXZ2]. 
 8. See Paul Rogers, Drought or No Drought: Jerry Brown Sets Permanent 
Water Conservation Rules for Californians, MERCURY NEWS (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/31/california-drought-jerry-brown-sets-
permanent-water-conservation-rules-with-new-laws/ [https://perma.cc/2EJF-8VHA].  
 9. Id. 
 10. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8 (4th ed. 2009) 
(explaining “[s]everal states originally recognized riparian rights, but later converted 
to a system of appropriation while preserving existing riparian rights. These states that 
follow this hybrid approach are: California[,] Kansas[,] Mississippi[,] Nebraska[,] 
North Dakota[,] Oklahoma[,] Oregon[,] South Dakota[,] Texas[, and] 
Washington[.]”). 
 11. See id. at 16 (explaining “[t]he fundamental principle of the riparian 
doctrine is that the owner of the riparian land, i.e., land bordering a waterbody, 
acquires certain rights to use the water. Each riparian landowner may make reasonable 
use of the water on the riparian land if the use does not interfere with reasonable uses 
of other riparian owners.”). 
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source.12 A jurisdiction that enforces both the appropriation and 
riparian doctrines, California has enshrined both the riparian 
doctrine’s reasonable-use requirement and the appropriation 
doctrine’s beneficial-use requirement in its constitution.13 When the 
two water rights doctrines conflict in the state, state law privileges 
riparian rights over appropriative rights.14  
California’s drought engendered lawsuits. Lawsuits arose when 
the state agency tasked with overseeing water quality, allocation, and 
beneficial use, the State Water Resources Control Board (State Water 
Board), moved to curtail private water uses in the state in 2015.15 
California’s complex water-rights system upholds appropriative water 
rights, in particular, based on the age of the claim to water, with 1914 
being the decisive year since the legislature required permitting for 
water rights beginning that year.16 Pre-1914 water rights claims are not 
subject to permitting, and they are considered more senior water 
rights, limited only by the amount of historical diversion.17 Both pre- 
and post-1914 rights are subject to the state’s police power.18 In other 
words, some California water rights date back to the nineteenth 
century and have priority dates that are nearly 150 years old.   
In response to the drought, in 2015, the State Water Board 
curtailed water uses and imposed penalties of up to $10,000 a day for 
violation of its curtailment notices, which also encompassed pre-1914 
rights-holders.19 Rights-holders sued and argued, inter alia, that the 
State Water Board lacked jurisdiction over senior water rights-holders, 
and the State Water Board could not curtail their water rights.20 The 
court agreed with the rights-holders.21 As in many other states, 
however, a water right in California is a right to use the water, a 
usufructuary right, which does not vest the owner with ownership of 
 
 12. See id. at 7 (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine governs in 
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming). 
 13. See Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, No. 2015-1-CV-285182, slip op. at 7–
8 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2018).  
 14. See CAL. CONST. art. X § 2; Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, slip op. at 8. 
 15. On the role of the State Water Board, see CAL. WATER BOARDS, 
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/H5RR-XT5E] (last visited Dec. 
23, 2019). See also Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, slip op. at 8–10. 
 16. Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, slip op. at 7. 
 17. See id. at 7–8. 
 18. See id. at 8. 
 19. Id. at 13–16. 
 20. See id. at 21–31. 
 21. See id. at 30. 
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the water itself.22 Ownership of the water remains with the public.23 
The question arises, therefore, of what should be done to balance 
public ownership of water with a private rights-holder’s usufructuary 
right in a moment of public emergency. That is, when should the 
public’s claim to its own resource be at its most emphatic? 
Curtailment of water rights during drought as a matter of public 
necessity is not only a California concern. Cities in Colorado, Idaho, 
Maryland, and Oregon, among others, have also considered or 
curtailed water uses during public emergencies.24 The focus of this 
paper is, thus, which arguments in the public interest should a 
legislator, regulator, or court use in moments of public emergency as 
a basis to curtail private exercise of often long-held water rights? The 
distinction between the public and the private has historically arisen 
to great contention in western states, and the problems arising from 
the distinction are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.25 
Implicit in this discussion are, thus, a variety of water-rights doctrines, 
some millennia old, and they go to the public/private distinction in 
water rights, each of which I will briefly explore.  
 
 22. See Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 
45 CALIF. L. REV. 638, 640 (1957).  
 23. See id. at 642. 
 24. See Brent Gardner-Smith, Mandatory Curtailment of Water Rights in CO 
Raised as Possibility, ASPEN TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.aspentimes.com/news/local/mandatory-curtailment-of-water-rights-in-
co-raised-as-possibility/ [https://perma.cc/TFV5-ME95] (Colorado); Greg Garland, 
Maryland Drought is Worst in 70 Years; No Relief Seen; Water Use Restricted; 
Curtailment Notices and Orders, IDAHO DEP’T OF WATER RES., 
https://idwr.idaho.gov/legal-actions/curtailments [https://perma.cc/Z94P-U3XU] 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (Idaho); Water Curtailment Plan, CITY OF BANKS, OR., 
https://www.cityofbanks.org/watercurtailmentplan [https://perma.cc/Z4Y9-2LSH] 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (Oregon); Livestock, Crops Suffer, BALT. SUN (July 10, 
1999), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1999-07-10-9907100112-
story.html [https://perma.cc/756A-A75S] (Maryland). 
 25. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of 
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (discussing the public nature of the 
water right as a distinctive kind of property right); Frank J. Trelease, Policies for 
Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 1, 2 (1965) (arguing that water rights should be treated like other 
property rights, which redounds to the public good); Scott Andrew Shepard, The 
Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation & 
Ecological Protection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
1063, 1070 (2009) (asserting that water rights are compensable property rights). See 
generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 228 (2015) (providing an excellent overview of the public–
private tension in water rights since the inception of the prior appropriation doctrine).  
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Given the breadth of any paper discussing the public/private 
divide in water rights, the Article builds on the work of other scholars 
and cases in order to draw its conclusions. The Article’s contribution 
is not only its expanded and more recent synthesis of legal doctrines 
in response to the particular question about what courts and state laws 
mean when they state that water belongs to the public but also how 
such doctrines might apply to a particular recent case and to those that 
will likely follow. My Article’s insight is that water, in jurisdictions 
like California, always belongs to the public, and the public can and 
should intervene during moments of public emergency to regulate the 
public resource that is water, even expansively, in the public interest—
subject to federal constitutional limitations based on long-held public 
values governing water.  
Part I engages with older sources to explore the public dimension 
of water as property. While some might find jarring the presence of as 
many references to either Roman water law or nineteenth-century case 
law and their antecedents in an article on current American water law, 
an understanding of previous case law and its antecedents is pivotal to 
understanding the development of American water rights. Such an 
understanding is vital because nineteenth-century case law gave rise 
to a major part of American water law, notably the appropriation 
doctrine, which is distinctly American in its development. Water law’s 
past is, thus, in some ways its present—and it is still good law. Current 
water law cases, almost 150 years later after many of those nineteenth-
century cases, continue to cite to such older case law.26  
The first section in Part I explores the usufructuary nature of the 
water right. Courts and commentators often rely on the insight that 
water is a usufruct, without going into much detail about what that 
 
 26. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 
1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853)); Baley v. 
United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 669 (2017) (citing Irwin v. Philips, 5 Cal. 140, 143 
(1855)); Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 264 (Colo. 2015) (citing Coffin v. Left Hand 
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882)); McKenna v. Witte, 346 P.3d 35, 40 (Colo. 2015) 
(citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447); Kemper v. Hamiliton, 274 P.3d 562, 573 (Colo. 2012) 
(citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 443); Kobobel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 
1137 (Colo. 2011) (citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447); V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotten, 233 
P.3d 1200, 1208 (Colo. 2010) (citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447); City of Pocatello v. State, 
180 P.3d 1048, 1053 (Idaho 2008) (citing Eddy, 3 Cal. at 252); City of Pocatello v. 
State, 180 P.3d 1048, 1054 (Colo. 2008) (citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 443); Archuleta v. 
Gomez, 140 P.3d 281, 284 (Colo. App. 2006) (citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 443); In re 
Water Rights Of: Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 2008 Colo. Water LEXIS 35, 
at *22 (2008) (citing Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447); Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. 
Commonwealth, No. 3001-RW/RC, 2007 WL 6002103, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) 
(citing Irwin, 5 Cal. at 140). 
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entails.27 The usufruct originated in Roman law, where it privileged 
the rights of the owner over those of the usufructuary—the individual 
who had rights to the fruits of a given piece of property.28 Under 
Roman law, the owner “retained bare ownership” of the thing, “and he 
could dispose of the thing without violating the rights of the 
usufructuary.”29 The usufructuary, on the other hand, “had the thing at 
his disposal and had the right to take the fruits without diminishing, 
deteriorating, or destroying it.”30 A usufruct was possible in almost 
“anything,” including fruit, land, minerals, perishable goods, real 
estate, and slaves.31 Significantly, the usufruct had to be surrendered 
to the owner, usually at the death of the usufructuary.32  
As property, the usufruct thus delineates the boundaries of 
private use of water, and the usufruct merely permits the private rights-
holder to draw fruits or profits from the use of the water, which always 
belongs to the public. As such, the private user of the water is not the 
owner of the water and only occupies a transitional proprietary interest 
in the use of the water, whose title remains in the people of the state. 
Part I also briefly examines the statutory and constitutional language 
of public ownership of water in a number of western states, since a 
number of state constitutions or statutes provide that water belongs to 
the public or to the people of the state. Such statutory or constitutional 
language similarly underscores the usufructuary nature of the water 
right, and it also makes clear that a legislative grant of administrative 
and judicial discretion in water-rights cases in the name of the public 
at large is at play in water-rights cases.  
So as to draw attention to the limited nature of usufructuary 
rights in water, Part I also examines the public dimension of key 
water-law doctrines. The public trust doctrine, for example, holds that 
the state acts as a fiduciary of the natural resources within its 
boundaries for the public’s benefit. States like California have raised 
the doctrine to constitutional status, and they have adopted an 
expansive view of the doctrine on behalf of their citizens. In 
 
 27. See David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property in Tulare v. United 
States, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 461, 488–90 (2007).  
 28. See RAFAEL DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 158 (2018).  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.; see also ANDREW M. RIGGSBY, ROMAN LAW AND THE LEGAL WORLD 
OF THE ROMANS 145 (2010).  
 31. DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 159, 185; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 143, 
144; WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION 
OF THE SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 60 (1908).  
 32. DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 159; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 144, 274-
75. 
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California, the public trust doctrine has undergone landmark changes. 
The doctrine may operate as a defense to Takings claims in some 
cases, and, in others, it requires the payment of just compensation. Part 
I also explores the federal navigation servitude, which provides that 
the federal government may act to protect the public’s dominant 
interest in navigation against riparian landowners, which is subject to 
the No Compensation Rule for the riparian landowner, under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Part I concludes with an 
examination of other state and federal doctrines that underscore the 
public dimension of a water right.  
Part II proposes solutions. Beginning with a state constitutional 
amendment in California that would make explicit the usufructuary 
nature of a water right and the public’s continued right to regulate its 
property interest, especially during a public emergency, the Part also 
proposes a similar legislative solution. Should the constitutional 
amendment fail, a legislative enactment might codify the language of 
the constitutional amendment. Indeed, these changes are proposed in 
addition to what other commentators have suggested along similar 
lines, including additional funding for the State Water Resources 
Board so that it might be more appropriately equipped to face 
challenges during a drought. Similar arguments, or their beginnings, 
have been made by Joseph L. Sax and others.33 My contribution is to 
expand upon these and other insights, while applying them to a recent 
water-rights case. I then consider how a constitutional amendment 
might have helped in the California drought case in which the State 
Water Board was defeated in court for curtailing water during a public 
emergency.  
I. WATER AND THE PUBLIC 
This Part begins with an exploration of the usufructuary nature 
of a water right. The usufruct underscores public ownership of a water 
right, and it makes clear that the private rights-holder merely may 
draw fruits or profits from public water, but the rights-holder does not 
own the water. Roman law and foundational American case law 
dealing with water—which remain relevant today—also demonstrate 
the public nature of an American water right. The Part concludes with 
 
 33. See Gabrielle Kavounas, Note, California’s Curse: Perpetual Drought 
and Persistent Land Development, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2016); Dave 
Owen, The Public Trust Doctrine 30 Years Later: The Mono Lake Case, the Public 
Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1105 
(2012); Sax, supra note 25, at 260. 
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an examination of the statutory and constitutional language of public 
ownership of water in western states, and it takes a look at the various 
doctrines governing water to show that water belongs to the public. 
A. Water as Usufruct 
At the beginning of water law is the usufruct. Cases and 
commentators describe water as a usufruct, often without going into 
much detail about the meaning and entailments of such a designation. 
Courts and commentators often altogether misconstrue the 
usufructuary nature of water.34 What, therefore, is a “usufruct,” and 
why does an understanding of its meaning matter? 
1. The Tarnished History of the Usufruct 
The usufruct is a Roman-law creation.35 Initially intended to 
provide women with sustenance for a period of time after the death of 
the male head of the household, the usufruct eventually extended to 
almost everything else, including slaves, who were “things,” or res, 
under Roman law.36 The usufruct allowed the usufructuary to draw 
fruits or profits from the res, without damaging or destroying the res.37 
The usufructuary could neither alienate the usufruct, nor could the 
usufructuary transfer the usufruct to anyone other than the owner.38 At 
the end of the usufructuary’s life, the property was to be returned to 
the owner.39 An implicit standard of care applied to the usufruct.40 The 
usufructuary was to take care of the property like the owner, invariably 
a male citizen, would have.41 The owner also owed responsibilities to 
the usufructuary, as defined in the terms governing the usufruct.42  
Implicitly relying on Roman law, more recent commentators 
have noted that the usufruct is a right to “use and consume resources, 
limited by others having rights to access, use, and consume them on 
 
 34. See generally Anderson, supra note 27 (explaining how the commentary 
misconstrued the usufructuary nature of water).  
 35. See DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 158; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 143.  
 36. See DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 158; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 144; 
BUCKLAND, supra note 31, at 10–38. 
 37. DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 158; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 145. 
 38. DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 158. 
 39. See id. at 159, 274; RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 144. 
 40. RIGGSBY, supra note 30, at 145. 
 41. Id.  
 42. DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 158. 
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similar terms.”43 Tribal customary laws provide examples of the 
usufruct, given that usufructs involve “the use and enjoyment of the 
profits of property belonging to another as long as that property is not 
damaged or altered in any way.”44 As such, the usufruct is a 
transitional entitlement in duration that permits the use of specific land 
for either a short or medium period of time.45 A usufruct “carved out 
of public lands” can be of a few hours duration, for example.46 The 
usufruct is thus a property interest of a predetermined duration 
permitting its holder to draw the “profits” of the property without 
damaging or altering it.  
At the basis of the usufruct is the “classic usufruct.” “[A] classic 
usufruct can be defined as an immutable package of land-use rights 
that are not transferable and that terminate when the usufruct’s owner 
dies or ceases the use, at which time the land is again up for grabs 
among group members.”47 Classic usufructs eliminate transactional 
costs associated with fee simples and lands sales, but classic usufructs 
could also encourage rent-seeking “as would-be successors jockey for 
position in a usufruct’s late stages.”48 Such usufructs might also 
encourage landowners to be shortsighted as they might deplete the 
resource while it is under their control.49  
The first American opinion to mention the usufruct in the 
property rights context, Somerville v. Johnson, is from 1770.50 It is, 
unfortunately, a slavery case. The case illuminates, nonetheless, the 
continuing legacy of Roman law and its effect on the evolution and 
nature of the usufruct in American law, which has remained largely 
unchanged since 1770. Somerville asks whether the slave children 
born after the death of the testator to Priscilla, a slave, could be 
considered part of the “use” of Priscilla, which “use” the testator 
 
 43. Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 
N.C. L. REV. 415, 443 (2017). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 746 (explaining usufruct as proof of the ancestry in 
property law of the right to exclude given that the usufruct is possibly the first property 
rights regime). 
 44. John C. Hoelle, Note, Re-Evaluating Tribal Customs of Land Use Rights, 
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 552 (2011) (quoting Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon 
Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680, 686 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1992)). 
 45. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1364 
(1993).  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Somerville v. Johnson, 1 H. & McH. 348, 352 (Md. 1770). 
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bequeathed to the life tenant, or if Priscilla’s children were an 
“accessory.”51 In that case, the Maryland Court of Chancery 
determined that Priscilla’s children were part of the life tenant’s “use” 
of Priscilla and part of the bounty.52 Somerville v. Johnson makes clear 
that the usufruct quite literally means—in the worst possible sense—
the “fruits” from which a profit might be drawn, with care given not 
to damage the usufruct because the usufructuary is not the owner. The 
view reflects Roman law concerning slaves as usufructs.53 Cases from 
other jurisdictions also support this view of the usufruct as “fruit,” 
“profit,” “revenue,” or “benefit.”54  
Water rights cases, unfortunately, confirm this meaning. The 
first water rights opinion to mention a usufruct dates more than fifty 
years after Somerville v. Johnson, and it only mentions a usufruct in 
passing.55 An 1825 opinion from Connecticut, Mitchell v. Warner, 
however, clarifies the meaning of the usufructuary right in water.56 In 
that case, when the defendant entered upon the plaintiff’s land and 
diverted water from the stream for his own use and was said to have 
disseized the plaintiff of the land, the plaintiff sued for breach of the 
covenant of warranty, which guarantees peaceable enjoyment of 
 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 354.   
 53. BUCKLAND, supra note 31, at 356 (“The usufructuary is not owner, and 
thus a legacy of ‘my slaves’ does not cover those in which I have a usufruct, and does 
cover those in which I have granted a usufruct to someone else.”).  
 54. THOMAS CURRY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 97 (1837) (explaining parents have 
usufruct in their children during their minority and may “benefit” from it); THOMAS 
CURRY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF LOUISIANA 509 (1842) (explaining children of slaves are not “natural fruits” 
belonging to the usufructuary within the meaning of the state code); SIMON 
GREENLEAF, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE 8 (1820–1821) (explaining husband acquires the 
usufruct or “profits” of the lands of which wife is seized in fee at marriage); O.C. & 
R.K. HARTLEY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 628–29 (1858) (explaining usufructuary does not own the 
usufruct but enjoys “enlarged rights” insofar as he may enjoy the fruits of the usufruct 
except for slaves). 
 55. See THOMAS HARRIS & REVERDY JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED 
& DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 205 (1825). To be sure, the 
first case mentioning the usufruct in the water-rights context is from 1811. See 
WILLIAM JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF JUDICATURE AND IN THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS AND THE 
CORRECTION OF ERRORS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 507 (1813). In that case, the court 
itself does not use the term but counsel does. See id.  
 56. See THOMAS DAY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 519–20 (2d ed. 1913).   
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property.57 The issue was whether water was, like land and tenements, 
covered by the covenant of warranty.58 In holding that the covenant of 
warranty did not include water because it was neither land nor 
tenement, the court identified, in language that merits citation at some 
length, why water is a usufruct and why its ownership cannot be said 
to permanent by any means: 
Water is neither land nor tenement, nor susceptible of absolute ownership. 
It is a moveable, wandering thing; and must, of necessity, continue common 
by law of nature. It admits only of a transient, usufructuary property; and if 
it escape for a moment, the right to it is gone forever; the qualified owner 
having no legal power of reclamation. Consistently with the preceding 
remarks, it is not capable of being sued for, by the name of water, or by a 
calculation of its cubical or superficial measure; but the suit must be brought 
for the land that lies at the bottom, covered with water. Hence, as it is said 
in the authorities just cited, water is a distinct thing from land. The truth of 
this observation will be recognized, by every person, who understands the 
natural properties of each. No action of trespass is sustainable for poisoning 
the water on a person’s land. But trespass on the case may be maintained, 
for the injury done to a usufructuary right. The same observation is equally 
applicable to air and light; and on account of its fugitive nature, water is 
classed, by all jurists, with these elements. Hence, the air which hovers over 
one’s land, and the light which shines upon it, are as much land, and 
embraced by a covenant of general warranty, as water is. As water is not 
land, neither is it a tenement; because it is not of a permanent nature, nor 
the subject of absolute property.59 
Water law has indeed evolved significantly since 1825. Nevertheless, 
the extract above makes clear that, inasmuch as water is not 
“susceptible of absolute ownership,” the usufruct is a subordinate 
property right.60 A water right is, therefore, a subservient or dependent 
property right actionable only within a predetermined scope. This is 
 
 57. See id. at 516–17.  
 58. See id. at 517. 
 59. Id. at 519–20 (citations omitted). 
 60. See id. at 519; see also N. SAXTON, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED IN THE 
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 189 (2d ed. 1886) (“There is no 
such thing as actual property in running water. It is transient in its nature, and must be 
permitted to flow for the common benefit.”); JOHN L. WENDELL, REPORTS OF CASES 
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS 628 (1836) 
(“By the general sense of mankind, the use and control of rivers that are subservient 
to commerce, has been considered a thing of common right, while from the nature of 
the element, individual property in the water flowing in such rivers must be regarded 
as transcient, [sic] usufructuary and subordinate.”); JOHN L. WENDELL, REPORTS OF 
CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME JUDICATURE AND IN THE COURT FOR 
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 331 (1840) (“No proprietor 
has a right to use the water, to the prejudice of other proprietors above or below him. 
He has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along.”). 
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still the case in riparian jurisdictions, for example, where the usufruct 
runs with the land.61  
About twenty-five years after Mitchell v. Warner, the mid-
nineteenth century brought the California Gold Rush, which gave rise 
to the prior appropriation doctrine that grew out of western mining 
customs.62 The foundational California case from 1855, Irwin v. 
Philips, held that the equitable maxim qui prior est in tempore, potior 
est in jure (first in time is first in right) applied in water rights dispute 
between a riparian and appropriating miner along a stream.63 Counsel 
in that case argued that “[t]he right of property [was] merely 
usufructuary,” and the court, in dicta, noted that use rights in water 
might apply to private landowners, but that was not the case since the 
land through which the water ran in the case belonged to the public.64  
Another foundational water-rights case from around the same 
time also makes the usufructuary nature of water clear. “The property 
in the water, by reason of riparian ownership, is in the nature of a 
usufruct,” Crandall v. Woods stated, “and consists in general not so 
much in the fluid as in the advantage of its impetus.”65 Cases from 
other jurisdictions similarly stipulate that the usufructuary nature of a 
water right is about use and not ownership.66 Foundational cases thus 
identify the usufruct as a transitional property right subordinate to a 
property right in land since a water right is only a use right. The 
usufructuary thus does not own the water and must always remain 
 
 61. See Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 922, 926 (Cal. 1884) (citing to various state 
precedents indicating that both the appropriation and riparian rights regimes are 
usufructuary).   
 62. United States v. Hunter, 236 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (“After 
the discovery of gold in California in January 1848, followed by the ceding of part of 
the public lands of Mexico to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
9 Stat. 922 on July 4, 1848, a rush of population from the East poured into California 
to occupy and mine the public lands now belonging to the United States. As disputes 
arose between the miners as to possession of mining locations as well as the use of 
water necessary to successful hydraulic or placer mining operations, customs became 
established in the mining camps to the use of water by prior appropriation—‘first in 
time, first in right’–which became valid local law in the absence of any specific State 
or Federal legislation authorizing the appropriation of water, or providing procedural 
steps for acquiring appropriative rights therein.”). 
 63. See W.M. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 147 (1906). 
 64. Id. at 143–44. 
 65. Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 141 (1857).   
 66. See, e.g., Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127, 130 (1856) (holding that riparian 
proprietor “has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes 
along”); see also Haas v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588, 589 (1856) (stating that proprietor 
“has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along”). 
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aware of the limitations placed upon the right to use water. While the 
usufructuary may draw benefits, profit, and revenue from the use of 
the water, the usufructuary is answerable for any damage to the 
usufruct or for surpassing the bounded nature of the rights granted by 
the usufruct.  
2. Current Problems Defining the Usufruct 
While a number of more recent cases, including from California, 
state that water is a usufruct, problems continue to arise in defining 
the usufruct.67 Commentators and cases are split on the usufructuary 
nature of the water right. One understanding of “usufructuary” extends 
the use right from the water’s source of diversion through its beneficial 
use by the usufructuary, while the other separates the diversion of the 
water at its source from the water’s later beneficial use.  
In other words, the first view envisions one continued use of 
water from removal of the water from its source through to its later 
beneficial use in irrigation, manufacturing, and other recognized 
beneficial uses of water, depending on the jurisdiction. The second 
view holds, meanwhile, that we can only speak of a usufructuary right 
when discussing the right to make use of water from the source. Once 
the water is diverted, what follows afterward amounts not to the 
usufruct but to possession or ownership. After possession, beneficial 
 
 67. See, e.g., N. Cal. Water Ass’n. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 230 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 142, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted) (“The right conferred is the 
‘right to use the water—to divert it from its natural course.’ The right is usufructuary 
only and confers no right of private ownership of water in a watercourse. ‘Unlike real 
property rights, usufructuary water rights are limited and uncertain.’”); see also Grand 
Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc., 386 P.3d 452, 461 (Colo. 2016) 
(citations omitted) (“Under Colorado’s doctrine of prior appropriation, a water right 
is a usufructuary right that affords its owner the right to use and enjoy a portion of the 
waters of the state. One does not ‘own’ water, but owns the right to use water within 
the limitations of this doctrine.”); Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 200, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 
658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) for the proposition that “the Legislature, acting directly 
or through an authorized agency such as the Water Board, has the power to grant 
usufructuary licenses that will permit an appropriator to take water . . .”); People v. 
Davis, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted) (“Water is a 
resource for which ‘[o]wnership . . . is vested [collectively] in the state’s residents 
. . . .’ ‘Hence, the cases do not speak of the ownership of water, but only of the right 
to its use.’”); Heal Utah v. Kane Cty. Water Conservancy Dist., 378 P.3d 1246, 1250 
(Utah Ct. App. 2016) (observing that permit issued by the State Engineer “gives an 
individual only a usufruct in water—the right to use some maximum quantity of water 
from a specified source, at a specific point of diversion or withdrawal, for a specific 
use and at a specific time”). 
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use of water is required by law, but it is not part of the usufructuary 
right. The second view, thus, breaks the sourcing of water down into 
three phases, which has legal consequences. I now examine each of 
these understandings in more detail before concluding that the first 
view, envisioning one continuous use from diversion to beneficial use, 
is the sounder one.  
The first view of one continuous use from source to beneficial 
use can be implied from the case law. Case law provides that an 
individual or entity may remove water from its original source and use 
it in a legally cognizable manner, that is, for irrigation, industry, 
household uses, and so on. The individual or entity “uses” the water, 
first, by diverting or removing it from its source and, second, the 
individual or entity extends the terms of the use by putting the water 
to a recognized beneficial use. The famous—or infamous—public 
trust Supreme Court of California opinion, National Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court, advances this view: 
       “It is laid down by our law writers, that the right of property in water is 
usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage 
of its use.” Hence, the cases do not speak of the ownership of water, but 
only of the right to its use. Accordingly, Water Code section 102 provides 
that “[all] water within the State is the property of the people of the State, 
but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the 
manner provided by law.”68 
In other words, there are only two property interests implicit in a 
discussion of water. One is ownership (which rests with the public), 
and the other is usufructuary (which rests with the user). The 
usufructuary right attaches to and travels with the water from its 
appropriation through its beneficial use (“the advantage of its use”). 
The requirement of beneficial use is thus collapsed into the 
appropriation requirement, and the very terms “beneficial use” 
indicate that “beneficial use” involves a use right. Such a right bestows 
an “advantage of its use,” with ownership of the water remaining with 
the “people of the State,” who have chosen to grant use rights to 
members of the public through the intermediary of the state permits, 
 
 68. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853)); Orange County 
Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, 14 Cal. App. 5th 343, 403 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017) (quoting National Audubon for the same proposition). For a spirited 
reaction to the National Audubon opinion, see, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). Revising that reaction in part, see 
Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make it Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139 (2015).   
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under specific conditions.69 The state may, thus, subsequently act in 
the public interest to regulate or control the full extent of the usufruct 
because each usufruct derives from “public waters.”70 
Under this approach, the emphasis is on a unified “use” and the 
terms of such a use. The public grants the individual the right to use a 
specific amount of water over time and cares about the specific uses 
made of that water. The key questions that follow from such a grant 
are: How much water has the individual withdrawn from the public 
over the time, and how has that water been used? Has the individual 
exceeded or violated the terms of the use right? As a Colorado 
Supreme Court opinion observes in this regard:  
       Property rights in water are usufructuary; ownership of the resource 
itself remains in the public. Because beneficial use defines the genesis and 
maturation of every appropriative water right in this state, we have held that 
every [water rights] decree includes an implied limitation that diversions 
cannot exceed that which can be used beneficially, and that the right to 
change a water right is limited to that amount of water actually used 
beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator’s place of use.71  
The usufructuary right thus flows from public ownership of the 
resource, and the public requires approved beneficial uses of its 
resource, which are recognized limitations placed by the public on the 
beneficial use of the water right.72 
 
 69. The view that the usufruct merely conveys “an advantage” is supported 
by older but equally important California precedent, which notes that “by all the 
modern, as well as ancient, authorities, the right in the water is usufructuary, and 
consists not so much in the fluid itself as in its uses, including the benefits derived 
from its momentum or impetus.” Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 753 (Cal. 1886) (emphasis 
omitted); see also In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 332 (Cal. 
1988) (explaining Lux v. Haggin is “widely recognized as the landmark decision 
holding that California adopted the riparian system of water rights when it received 
the common law in 1850” and “California thus became a ‘dual’ water rights state, 
recognizing both riparian and appropriative rights”). 
 70. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 724).  
 71. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 
(Colo. 1999) (citation omitted).  
 72. Indeed, a ballot initiative upheld by the Supreme Court of Colorado to 
amend the Colorado constitution proposing an expansion of public control of waters 
in the state would have made this explicit. See In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission 
Clause for 2011–2012 #45, 274 P.3d 576, 583 (Colo. 2012) (“(2) The use of water is 
a usufruct property right, granted by the public to water users, that shall require the 
water use appropriator to return water unimpaired to the public, after use, so as to 
protect the natural environment and the public’s use and enjoyment of waters.”); see 
also Clay v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 951 S.W.2d 617, 629 (citations 
omitted) (Mo. App. W.D. 1977) (explaining, in a previous opinion, “[w]e noted that 
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While the first understanding of the usufruct identifies one 
continued use from diversion to beneficial use, the second, on the 
other hand, holds that the usufruct only extends to the right to use the 
watercourse, and once removal or diversion of the water from its 
source has occurred, the right becomes possessory, or it gives rise to 
ownership.73 In other words, the usufruct lies only in the right to make 
use of water, but once the water is diverted from the watercourse, it is 
transformed into a possessory property interest, which does not 
include an entitlement to make beneficial use of the water.74 
Commentators, thus, argue that this understanding is correct because 
once water has been diverted and is in the individual’s possession, the 
right to the water is no longer usufructuary but possessory.75 
Conflating both meanings and extending their purview to include 
beneficial use, they argue, is erroneous because the usufructuary right 
only covers the entitlement to remove or divert running water from its 
source.76 Once removed from the source, water is a possessory interest 
owned by the private holder of the water right.  
They are wrong. Possession is by no means incompatible with 
the view of a unified usufruct, and the second view incorrectly imputes 
to the act of possession the creation of a possessory property water 
right independent of the usufructuary right. Under Roman law, a 
usufruct could be possessed, and the usufructuary could bring suit 
against the owner for violation of the terms of the usufruct—without 
undermining the owner’s superior property interest.77 As recent 
American case law states, an individual possesses a usufructuary right 
to water.78 Other case law similarly refutes the second view of the 
 
the nature of a landowner’s property right in the water is usufructuary, not absolute. 
This means that a landowner does not own subterranean percolating water, but can 
use the water he diverts freely ‘for any purpose incidental to his beneficial enjoyment 
of the land.’ The landowner could convey his right to use the water, but not the water 
itself”). 
 73. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 488–89, 509–10; see also City of Santa 
Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (relying on 
Anderson).   
 74. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 488–89, 509–10.   
 75. Id. at 489, 509–10.   
 76. Id. at 492, 509–10.   
 77. See DOMINGO, supra note 28, at 159 (“Although originally a usufruct 
could not be possessed, classical lawyers sometimes extended interdictal protection 
to the usufructuary. The usufructuary was protected with the vindicatio usus fructus 
(later called actio confessoria) against the owner or any possessor of the thing in 
question.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Dunwody v. Will-O-Wisp Metro. Dist., 2009 Colo. Water 
LEXIS 780, at *40 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 2009) (“Actual use is central to a claim for adverse 
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usufructuary right.79 A California appellate case, for example, implies 
that possession is an extension of the usufruct: “There could be but a 
usufructuary right [of streams]. And that right could be acquired only 
by an ‘appropriation’ made in the manner provided by law; that is, by 
reducing the water to actual possession for a beneficial use.”80 In other 
words, appropriation, possession, and beneficial use are all implicit in 
the usufruct, and they constrain the nature of the usufruct itself, which 
is a temporary grant from the public to the private entity or individual.  
The most prominent advocate of the second view, David B. 
Anderson, relies extensively on a seminal 1909 article by Samuel C. 
Wiel, “the foremost commentator on California and western water in 
the first part of the twentieth century,” to advance the incorrect view.81 
Anderson’s error is not in his reliance on an article that is over 100 
years old—far from it—but in his reliance on Wiel without verifying 
and updating Wiel’s views on everything from Roman law to the 
history of the usufruct.82 Such an oversight leads to the dismissal of 
the usufruct’s importance at common law by insisting instead that it is 
a civil-law artifact more than anything else, which undermines its 
importance for understanding the nature of a water right.83 For 
example, Anderson incorrectly argues that the usufruct “is an essential 
construct in the civil law of continental Europe, which is followed in 
the United States only by the State of Louisiana.”84 No, the ancient 
idea of the usufruct is also followed in water-rights cases outside 
Louisiana, and it has a long history in American property law, as this 
discussion has already shown, including its Roman meanings. 
Anderson also does not examine the relationship between the various 
ancient doctrines governing water as a public resource when issuing 
his conclusions regarding the usufructuary nature of water.85 In other 
words, these oversights undermine Anderson’s view in favor of an 
 
possession of a water right because use defines possession for a usufructuary right.”); 
see also In re Application A-15738 of Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Dist., 410 
N.W.2d 101, 106 (Neb. 1987) (“The use of the water of every natural stream within 
the State of Nebraska is dedicated to the people of the state for beneficial purposes. 
Neb. Const. art. XV, § 5. Thus, the first characteristic of the appropriative right is that 
the holder possesses merely a usufructuary right.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Simons v. Inyo Cerro Gordo Mining & Power Co., 192 P. 144 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920).   
 80. See id. at 150. 
 81. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 462. 
 82. See Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22. HARV. L. REV. 190 (1909).   
 83. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 487. 
 84. Id. at 491. 
 85. See id. at 487. 
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independent possessory right in water distinct from the usufruct, 
which is wrong because it undercuts the public’s ownership of the 
water resource from beginning to end.  
One of Anderson’s analogies shows how he misconstrues the 
nature of a usufruct. He cites to apples and apple pie so as to teach us 
about the nature of a water right: 
The mind that can clearly see that the fruit of an apple tree is an apple, and 
not apple pie, may yet have difficulty accepting that the fruit of the 
watercourse is water and not water beneficially used. But the truth is, this 
kind of legal disjuncture is quite ordinary, and examples of it abound.86  
In other words, the usufruct covers the right to pluck the fruit from the 
apple tree, and once the apple has been plucked, it is no longer 
usufructuary, but possessory, or it amounts to an act of ownership. If 
turned into apple pie, it is something entirely different, divorced from 
both the usufruct and the ownership interest. At that point, it has 
become a benefit and a legal requirement flowing from the initial 
water right. For its creative attempt to sever the chain in the public’s 
ownership of its res by envisaging the transformation of the res into 
something else when combined with the individual’s labor, 
Anderson’s view certainly has Lockean appeal—the apple, it seems, 
can be transformed into apple pie. But that is the end of its appeal. 
When water is diverted from its source and is used beneficially in 
irrigation, for example, water has not been transformed into something 
else; it is not the equivalent of an apple becoming apple pie, but the 
proverbial apple, unchanged. Similarly, when water is removed from 
its source and is used for household uses, the nature of the res is 
untransformed, and the owner of that resource, the public, can still 
identify its property as being the same from the point of diversion to 
the point of consumption, where it is beneficially used. In other words, 
if we are in the business of analogizing water to apples, which we 
should not be, an apple is an apple is an apple, and it always belongs 
to the public.  
The usufructuary right to water thus encompasses two 
understandings. The first envisions a unified use from diversion to 
beneficial use and the second envisages a trifurcated approach. The 
second is wrong, and the first is correct.  
 
 86. Id. at 497. 
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B. The American Afterlife of Roman Water Law 
The usufruct is merely the beginning of the discussion of a water 
right. A tangle of related water doctrines has also played a part in 
judicial and scholarly understanding of water in the United States and 
its relationship to the public and the private. The oldest of the doctrines 
also come from Roman law. I, therefore, begin this Section first with 
the historical importance of water as res publicae and res communes 
before examining the more recent understanding of water as publici 
juris.  
1. Res Publicae and Res Communes 
A number of influential Roman sources underscore the public 
dimension of water. Roman law distinguished, in relevant part, 
between res publicae and res communes.87 Res publicae are those 
“Things Belonging to the Public and Open to the Public by Operation 
of Law.”88 Perennial rivers and adjoining lands—as well as bridges, 
harbors, ports, and roads—were res publicae under Roman law, 
primarily for military reasons.89 Given concerns about “congestion and 
underinvestment” in res publicae, the public was required to conduct 
itself in a disciplined manner when using the resource, and the public 
was subject to the “customary rules of usage.”90 Given oversight 
demands made by the res publicae, they required government 
supervision to keep things in order.91 Even with the public dimension, 
res publicae were susceptible to private ownership.92 The United 
States has continued this tradition and has similarly made many 
resources res publicae for commercial reasons.93  
Res communes, on the other hand, are those things open to all 
but incapable of being objects of private property, since they cannot 
 
 87. See Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions 
of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89 (2003); see 
also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some 
Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 801 
(1979).  
 88. Rose, supra note 87, at 96. 
 89. See id. at 96–97. 
 90. See id. at 99.  
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 97.  
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be captured.94 They are, in essence, resources common to all. Res 
communes was thus public property not the object of commerce and 
did not absolutely belong to the people but was used for public 
purposes.95 As Justinian’s Institutes provide, “[b]y natural law, these 
things are the common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and 
with it the shores of the sea.”96 Such things can only “be enjoyed and 
used by everyone” in their parts but not in their totality.97 The medieval 
English jurist, Bracton, pursues this insight when he conceives of 
running water, the seas and shores, and the air as res communes.98 
Sixteenth-century English law similarly treated injury to the forest as 
an injury to res communes, actionable by those having rights to the 
forest’s use.99  
Nuisance theory and exclusive ownership subsequently replaced 
the action for res communes both in English law and American law.100 
In American law, the exclusive-ownership theory encouraged 
commercial exploitation of resources that were once part of the 
common patrimony embodied by res communes.101 American law 
nevertheless resuscitated res communes when the state proved 
“excessively generous” to private industry, that is, it always upheld 
the public dimension of the property.102 Recent case law has, therefore, 
continued to refer to resources that are common to all, such as air and 
the sea, as res communes.103 In the end, “[t]he concepts of res 
communes and res publicae actually were very similar. But res 
 
 94. See id. at 93; see also Coquillette, supra note 87, at 800 (reinforcing the 
idea that res communes are incapable of being exclusively owned). 
 95. See Coquillette, supra note 87, at 801 n.187.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. (emphasis added).  
 98. See id. at 804. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 804, 807.  
 101. See id. at 809 (citing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 34 (1977)).  
 102. See id.  
 103. See, e.g., Air-Serv Grp., LLC v. Commonwealth, 18 A.3d 448, 453 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2011) (“While air is a material substance, air has been historically treated 
as res communes, which means ‘[t]hings common to all; things that cannot be owned 
or appropriated, such as light, air, and the sea.’”); see also Bd. of Trs. of Internal 
Improvement Tr. Fund v. Webb, 618 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(quoting Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505 (Fla. 1923)) (proposing 
that American Spanish possessions provided that lands under navigable waters were 
res communes); Campion v. Simpson, 659 P.2d 766, 776 (Idaho 1983) (quoting 
Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812 (Idaho 1912)) (proposing that “wild animals, fish, 
water, gas, light, and air” are res communes). 
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publicae carried the additional implication of state ownership of the 
concerned property. Res publicae constituted ‘public property such as 
theatres, market places, rivers, harbors, etc. . . .’”104 Therefore, both 
res publicae and res communes underscore the public dimension of 
water with res communes enjoying a longer afterlife in American law.  
2. Water as Publici Juris  
Water as res communes gave rise to the idea of water as publici 
juris, which embraces the same idea as res communes. Publici juris 
refers to a resource the public has a right to enjoy.105 In its deployment 
of publici juris, an English case anticipates American water law’s 
view of the public dimension of a water right.  
The English case of Williams v. Morland involved an upstream 
defendant who built a dam and prevented stream water from reaching 
the downstream plaintiff in the natural and usual manner.106 The issue 
was whether the plaintiff could succeed without an allegation of the 
defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s use of the water.107 In 
upholding the jury’s verdict that the plaintiff had not suffered an 
injury, the King’s Bench paid attention to the nature of water.108 
“Flowing water,” the court reasoned, “is publici juris.”109 When “it is 
appropriated by an individual, his right” to it extends no farther than 
the benefit he immediately receives from it.110 Subject to the exercise 
of that right, the remains are publici juris.111 If an individual had an 
exclusive right to enjoyment of waters of the stream, that individual 
takes it “in derogation of the primitive right of the public.”112 Since the 
plaintiff had not appropriated the water and still had enough water to 
use as a member of the public, he had suffered no injury.113 Williams 
v. Morland was cited by over two dozen nineteenth-century American 
cases, including the foundational California case, Irwin v. Philips, 
discussed above.114  
 
 104. Coquillette, supra note 87, at 802 n.195 (citations omitted). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Williams v. Morland (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 620, 620 (KB). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See generally id. (showing that each judge discussed his view of the 
nature of running water as property). 
 109. Id. at 621. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145 (1855).  
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More recent cases pursuing the notion of the publici juris have 
similarly indicated that running water is publici juris and, as such, is 
property common to all.115 Running water, like air and light, is not 
capable of being private property, and an appropriator does not take 
title to the water.116 Courts have also stated that publici juris means 
that riparian landowners must take the competing rights of other 
riparians into consideration, and no riparian landowner has “an 
absolute right to insist that every drop of the water flow past his land 
exactly as it would in a state of nature.”117 Significantly, the riparian 
landowner enjoys “only a right to the benefit and advantage of the 
water flowing past his land” consistent with the rights of others.118 
Publici juris means that water is within the state’s regulatory power.119  
In sum, publici juris, res communes, and res publicae highlight 
the powerful and ancient claim of the public’s interest in water. 
Building on the nature of the usufruct, these doctrinal elements hold 
that no water right is absolute, and the public may intervene in matters 
concerning water.  
C. Public Ownership of Water 
Drawing implicitly on these doctrines and previous case law, a 
number of state constitutions and statutes have enshrined the public’s 
interest in water. Some state laws provide that the public owns the 
 
 115. See, e.g., In re ‘Īao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water 
Use Permit Applications & Petition, 287 P.3d 129, 181–82 (Haw. 2012) (Acoba, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1339 (Haw. 1973)) (“Consequently, ‘[n]o one may acquire property to running 
water in a natural watercourse; [] flowing water was publici juris; and [] it was 
common property to be used by all who had a right of access to it, as usufruct of the 
watercourse.’ Therefore, water, by its nature, is inherently intended for public use, 
and not subject to ownership by private interests to the exclusion of the public.”). 
 116. See Keating v. Pub. Power Dist., 713 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857 (D. Neb. 2010) 
(quoting Northport Irrigation Dist. v. Jess, 337 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Neb. 1983)); 
Frenchman Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Smith, 91 N.W.2d 415, 428 (Neb. 1968) (“The 
corpus of running water in a natural stream is not the subject of private ownership. 
‘Such water is classed with light and the air in the atmosphere. It is publici juris or 
belongs to the public . . . .’”); id. (“The appropriator of water of a stream does not 
acquire ownership of such water.”). 
 117. Koch v. Aupperle, 737 N.W.2d 869, 879 (Neb. 2007) (quoting Meng v. 
Coffee, 97 N.W. 713, 714 (Neb. 1903)). 
 118. Id. (quoting Meng, 97 N.W. at 714). 
 119. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 277 P.3d 1145, 1154 n.10 
(Or. 2010) (citing the Desert Land Act of 1877 for its provision that non-navigable 
waters in the federal public domain are “subject to the plenary control of the . . . 
states”).   
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waters in the state, while others indicate that the people own the waters 
in the state. The language is susceptible to confusion. Is “people” the 
same as “public”? Is the language merely a nod to the confusion of the 
law writers? Is such language merely hortatory?  
A number of western laws implicitly acknowledge that water is 
imbued with the attributes of res communes, res publicae, and publici 
juris.120 Arizona’s statutes, for example, provide that water from “all 
sources” belongs to the public and that such sources “are subject to 
appropriation and beneficial use.”121 California’s Water Code makes 
“[a]ll water within the State . . . the property of the people of the 
State,” subject to appropriation.122 More significantly, California’s 
constitution provides for “public use” of appropriated water “subject 
to the regulation and control of the State, in the manner to be 
prescribed by law.”123 The public-use right in California is expansive, 
encompassing three state constitutional provisions, which were 
drafted as a bulwark against the “peddling away [of the] public 
interest.”124 California has also codified a version of the public trust 
doctrine.125 Indeed, the Supreme Court of California has elevated the 
public trust doctrine to “a curious and unique hybrid, borne purely of 
customary law but constitutional in character.”126  
Other states similarly provide that water belongs to the public or 
to the people. Colorado’s constitution provides that unappropriated 
water in every natural stream in the state is “the property of the 
 
 120. I am grateful to Bret Adams et al. and Frank J. Trelease, whose overviews 
of state constitutions has greatly informed much of my discussion in this part. See 
generally Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in 
State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73 (2002); Trelease, supra 
note 22, at 640. 
 121. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-141 (2019). Arizona courts appear to have read 
the statutory provision to allow private appropriation of water. See, e.g., Neal v. Hunt, 
541 P.2d 559, 565 (Ariz. 1975). 
 122. Cal. Water Code § 102 (West 1971).  
 123. CAL. CONST. art. X § 5.  
 124. Adams et al., supra note 120, at 87.   
 125. See Friends of Martin’s Beach v. Beach, 2014 Cal. Super. LEXIS 12477, 
at *24 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2014) (reading Art. 10 § 4 of the state constitution as “a 
restatement or codification of the preexisting public trust doctrine as it relates to the 
tidelands and what rights flow from the tidelands”). 
 126. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: 
The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 877 (1996); see 
also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 742 (Cal. 1983) (holding, 
inter alia, that the state has “an affirmati[ve] . . . duty . . . to protect the people’s 
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right 
of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with 
the purposes of the trust”). 
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public,” and is “dedicated to the use of people of the state, subject to 
appropriation.”127 Idaho’s constitution provides that waters 
appropriated for private uses are also deemed a “public use, and 
subject to the regulations and control of the state in the manner 
prescribed by law.”128 Montana’s constitution provides that beneficial 
use of appropriated water is a “public use.”129 Texas’s Water Code 
implies that all water but groundwater is the “property of the state.”130 
In Texas, such waters are “waters of the state,” which are “held in trust 
for the public.”131 Wyoming’s constitution makes “[t]he water of all 
natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water . . . the 
property of the state.”132 Other states have similar provisions.133 
Courts have interpreted such language in a number of ways. 
Courts have read the language as providing a state with power to grant 
public access to waters that would otherwise be closed to the public.134 
Courts have read the language to empower the state to decide on 
permitting systems regarding water distribution.135 Courts have 
interpreted the language to authorize ballot initiatives that would 
amend the state constitution to include a version of the public trust 
doctrine.136 They have interpreted such language to empower state 
citizens, as members of the public, to appropriate such water and put 
 
 127. COLO. CONST. art. XVI § 5.   
 128. IDAHO CONST. art. XV § 1.  
 129. MONT. CONST. art. IX § 3(2).   
 130. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.021 (West 1977) (“The water of the ordinary 
flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of 
every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and 
rainwater of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in 
the state is the property of the state.”). 
 131. Id. § 11.0235. 
 132. WYO. CONST. art. VIII § 1.  
 133. See Trelease, supra note 22, at 642 (discussing North Dakota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and Washington).   
 134. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.04 (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2019) 
(discussing New Mexico, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, and South Dakota).   
 135. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001) 
(“While under California law the title to water always remains with the state, the right 
to the water’s use is transferred first by permit to DWR, and then by contract to end-
users, such as the plaintiffs.”); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of 
Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 79 (2010). 
 136. See, e.g., In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2011–2012 
#3, 274 P.3d 562, 569 (Colo. 2012); see also Bruce C. Walters, Note, Student 
Symposium: A Comparative Discussion of the Public Trust Doctrine: Mono Lake and 
Groundwater in California, Citizen Initiative and Legal Adaptation in Colorado, 18 
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 455, 459 (2015). 
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it to a beneficial use.137 They have rejected the argument that such 
language means that the state has absolute sovereignty over the waters 
within its boundaries in disputes between the state and federal 
governments.138 Courts have also relied on such language in 
determining whether a water right has been abandoned by non-use or 
lost through forfeiture.139 Thus, such language has been read to uphold 
the state’s police power when it comes to water, subject to certain 
limitations.  
For their part, commentators have argued that such language is 
“meaningless.”140 They indicate that federal case law helps us 
understand that because water, by its very nature, is “incapable of 
ownership, it is meaningless to declare that it is ‘owned by the people.’ 
One might as easily (and idly) say that the air is ‘owned’ by the 
people.”141 For such commentators, the language of public ownership 
in water law is, thus, merely an alternative means of declaring “that 
there is a strong public interest in the resource and it will readily be 
the subject of the state’s protection and stewardship in the interest of 
the people in the exercise of sovereign or governmental power.”142 In 
other words, the state may regulate uses of water within its boundaries 
and it may act as trustee of its waters.143  
The language of public ownership in state law therefore provides 
a state with at least two options. The first is the California option, 
which identifies a strong public interest in water, and it underscores 
the state’s police power to act as a trustee of water as a resource.144 The 
 
 137. Colorado courts, for example, have read the constitutional provision 
making water public property to uphold the public’s right to appropriate water under 
the constitution. See, e.g., American Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 
352, 369 (Colo. 1994); see also People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) 
(“This provision of the Colorado Constitution, upon which the defendants so heavily 
rely, simply and firmly establishes the right of appropriation in this state.”). 
 138. See Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled in part 
by United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16–17 (Colo. 1982). 
 139. See, e.g., In re Manse Spring & Its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311, 316 (Nev. 
1940). 
 140. See Trelease, supra note 22, at 643; Anderson, supra note 27, at 484 n.80.   
 141. Anderson, supra note 27, at 484 n.80 (emphasis omitted). 
 142. Id. (relying on Trelease, supra note 22).   
 143. Trelease, supra note 22. 
 144. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 716 n.11, 
717–18 n.14, 719–21, 724, 729, 732 (Cal. 1983) (issuing a peremptory writ of 
mandate and holding (1) that “plaintiffs have standing to sue to protect the public 
trust”; (2) this is not an advisory opinion but a case with a “hotly contested current 
controversy” (justiciability interests (the public interest) require that the case be 
allowed to proceed); (3) the public trust extends to non-navigable waterways whose 
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language of public ownership in a state like California is the language 
of administrative and judicial discretion, subject to Takings and other 
constraints, since it is up to the regulatory agency and courts to enforce 
the state’s water code. The second view is the Colorado option, which, 
while apportioning responsibility for enforcement of the water code 
between the state engineer and the water court, reads the language of 
public ownership to privilege citizen appropriation of unappropriated 
waters. California’s view is thus more capacious in its embodiment of 
the public dimension of a water right. It is, therefore, unsurprising that 
Colorado has not formally adopted the public trust doctrine, which I 
discuss further below.145 The difference between the two states’ 
approaches goes to the extent of the state’s police power when it 
comes to water as property. In this Article, I argue that the sounder 
view is California’s, which is consistent with the history of the public 
element in water law. 
D. Doctrines of Public Ownership 
The most prominent view of water as a limited property right is 
advanced by Joseph Sax. Sax argues, and this Article pursues the same 
insight, that although water rights are subject to constitutional Takings 
considerations, they are more limited in scope than other property 
rights since they are subject to a number of public considerations that 
courts and regulators might deploy to restrict them.146 Legal doctrines 
imbued with a public aspect include the public trust, the federal 
navigation servitude, state navigable waters, the public commons, and 
the recognized uses to which water might be put in both riparian and 
appropriation jurisdictions.147 The legislature might curtail water rights 
in the name of environmental protection, efficient use of natural 
 
diversion leads to damage in a navigable waterway; (4) the public trust protects scenic 
and recreational uses; (5) “the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in 
California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of 
nonnavigable tributaries” (6) “[t]he public trust doctrine and the appropriative water 
rights system are parts of an integrated system of water law;” (7) plaintiffs have a 
remedy before the state regulatory agency, the Water Board; and (8) courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the administrative agencies such that suit may be brought 
in court without exhausting administrative remedies). 
 145. See Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust 
Doctrine: What It Is, Where It Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (and Should 
Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 47, 48 (2012).  
 146. See Sax, supra note 25, at 260. 
 147. See id. at 260, 271. 
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resources, and efficient administration of water resources, which is not 
so for many other property rights.148  
In response to Sax, other commentators have insisted that water 
rights are compensable property rights, except in California which has 
a sui generis approach in cases involving the public trust.149 They insist 
“that attempts to preserve ecological values by eviscerating water 
rights are incoherent and unwise.”150 I now turn to a brief exploration 
of the current doctrines underscoring public ownership of water and 
the limitations placed on private ownership as a result.  
1. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine holds that a state, as sovereign, has a 
fiduciary duty on behalf of its general public to safeguard the state’s 
natural resources.151 In a few states, like California, the public trust 
doctrine is constitutional.152 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, a nineteenth-century 
federal case, greatly influenced the development of the public trust 
doctrine in the United States.153 In that case, in exchange for fixed 
payments, the State of Illinois granted Illinois Central Railroad title to 
the submerged lands under Lake Michigan in Chicago, which the 
railroad subsequently developed.154 The state legislature then repealed 
the statute permitting the grant of title to the railroad company, which 
the railroad company disobeyed.155 The Supreme Court of the United 
States upheld the state’s right to repeal the grant.156 As Alexandra B. 
Klass has noted, “Illinois Central stands as an early invocation of the 
public trust doctrine to prevent a state from placing public trust lands 
into private hands for short-term economic gain to the detriment of the 
long-term preservation of the resource for the public.”157  
 
 148. See id. at 262, 267. 
 149. See Shepard, supra note 25, at 1068–69.   
 150. Id. at 1070.  
 151. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 30.02. 
 152. See id.; TEX. WATER CODE § 11.021. 
 153. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 30.02. 
 154. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 448 (1892).   
 155. See id. at 449.   
 156. See id. at 464.   
 157. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights 
and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 705 (2006); Michael C. 
Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: 
From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L. REV. 1, 14 (2018) 
(“The Illinois Central decision confirmed that the PTD was a sovereign governmental 
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Citing extensively to Illinois Central for the proposition that the 
state has an “incontrovertible” trust obligation that it may not 
“abdicate,” California’s seminal public trust opinion, National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, revolutionized the doctrine’s 
application in the state.158 National Audubon involved a lawsuit by the 
National Audubon Society against the Department of Water and 
Power of the City of Los Angeles (DWP) for the environmental 
degradation of Mono Lake due to DWP’s depletion of the Lake.159 The 
question for the court was whether the appropriative water rights 
regime subsumed the public trust doctrine or if they functioned 
independently of each other.160 The Superior Court granted summary 
judgment to DWP and indicated its intent to hold that the public trust 
doctrine was subsumed by the prior-appropriation-water-rights 
doctrine and that administrative exhaustion was required.161 The 
California Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the public interest made 
the case justiciable, that “[t]he public trust doctrine and the 
appropriative water rights system are parts of an integrated system of 
water law,” and that the public trust extends to non-navigable 
waterways whose diversion leads to damage in a navigable waterway 
in the state.162 As such, the state had a duty “to protect the people’s 
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, 
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the 
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the 
trust.”163 
Consistent with this opinion, the public trust doctrine can operate 
as a defense against constitutional Takings claims.164 The California 
State Water Board has, thus, “reject[ed], based on the public trust 
doctrine and other background principles of California law, arguments 
for financial compensation by water users whose water licenses were 
 
obligation that was largely inalienable, seemingly universal, and protected by 
searching judicial review.”). 
 158. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 
1983); Owen, supra note 33, at 1099. Even before the National Audubon opinion, 
California was on the “cutting edge” of the doctrine. See id. at 1110. 
 159. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 716. 
 160. See id. at 717. 
 161. See id. at 717–18. 
 162. Id. at 717–18 n.14, 732. 
 163. Id. at 724. 
 164. See Klass, supra note 157, at 739; Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. 
Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a 
Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 61 (2011); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax 
and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 357–58 (1998). 
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modified by the Board to provide improved protection for trust 
resources.”165 Under the public trust doctrine, the public may also fish 
and navigate state waters without payment of compensation.166 
Nevertheless, legislatures “can confiscate private property so long as 
they pay just compensation.”167 That is, in some cases, the state may 
use the doctrine without compensation and, in others, like the state’s 
eminent-domain rights, application of the doctrine is subject to just 
compensation.168 The state might also rely on the public trust doctrine 
in the age of climate change to limit private water rights.169 
Water rights are, therefore, a sui generis form of property rights. 
It might even be said that the “National Audubon Mono Lake case and 
its progeny show that water ‘rights’ are not property, but a kind of 
revocable, usufruct privilege that is and always has been subject to 
government redefinition to reflect the changing needs of the 
citizenry—to reflect changing notions of progress.”170 Indeed, the 
public trust doctrine is a descendant of res communes, that is, such 
rights “were simply physically incapable of being converted to private 
ownership. Once the res communes became susceptible to private 
ownership, but as yet unappropriated (so-called res nullius), the 
potential limitations on private ownership under the public trust 
doctrine became relevant.”171 The public trust doctrine imposes 
limitations on the nature of water rights, and it marks as subordinate 
the private right to use the public’s resource.  
2. The Navigation Servitude 
Linked to the public trust doctrine is the navigation servitude. 
The navigation servitude identifies the federal government’s right to 
 
 165. John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background 
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 954 (2012). 
 166. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 61.04. 
 167. J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green 
Property: A Future Convergence, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918 (2012).  
 168. See Kavounas, supra note 33, at 1100-01. 
 169. See Elise O’Dea, Note, Reviving California’s Public Trust Doctrine and 
Taking a Proactive Approach to Water Management, Just in Time for Climate 
Change, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 435 (2014). 
 170. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, 
and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 762 (2008); See also 
Chloe Angelis, The Public Trust Doctrine and Sea Level Rise in California: Using the 
Public Trust to Restrict Coastal Armoring, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. POL’Y 
249, 267 (2013). 
 171. Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading 
Schemes: A Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 320 (2010).  
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act in the public’s navigation interest against riparian landowners.172 
The navigation servitude likely arose out of the public trust doctrine, 
and it protects the public’s navigational interest against Takings 
concerns.173 It also shares the same history as the public trust 
doctrine.174 Both doctrines are medieval in origin, and both burden 
private property with the sovereign’s right to uphold the public’s 
rights.175 Indeed, by the fifteenth century, English authorities noted 
that the sovereign owned the coast and that the people’s right to fish 
could not be impeded.176 Citizens could thus sue for the removal of a 
“nuisance” or “encroachment” to the public right to fish or navigate 
the sovereign’s waters.177 As such, an ancient public right to water has 
existed and has been vested in the sovereign, and subsequently in the 
quasi-sovereign at the state level, under the navigation servitude.  
The English sovereign’s power to act in the public’s navigation 
interest subsequently passed into American law. Under the Federal 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, the navigation servitude permits the 
federal government to regulate waterways up to the high-water mark, 
without having to pay affected private parties under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment—known as the “No Compensation 
Rule.”178 The federal government may act in the public interest to 
protect, for example, public navigation of waterways against riparian 
owners because such waters are “the public property of the nation.”179 
 
 172. See Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The 
Historical, Yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643, 1676 
(2013).  
 173. See Benjamin Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the 
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 174. See James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust 
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 175. See 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 61.04. 
 176. See Longstreth, supra note 173, at 481. 
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 178. Chris A. Shafer, Public Rights in Michigan’s Streams: Toward a Modern 
Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 9, 22 (1999) (discussing the “no 
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United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979) (giving information on the Commerce Clause 
power); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 35.02 (discussing the “no 
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or Less, 90 F.3d 790, 793 (3d Cir. 1996); Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717, 
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The federal government may make changes to a body of water, and it 
may “destroy or devalue property.”180 No right to compensation exists 
where the flow of a body of water is affected so as to protect a 
navigable waterway, where the bed or the banks of the navigable 
waterway are affected, and where access to a navigable waterway is 
affected.181  
Indeed, a number of key cases are at the basis of this view. The 
first American case dealing with navigation is Gibbons v. Ogden, 
which overturned as invalid a state law regarding navigation and 
located congressional power over navigation in the Commerce Clause 
under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution.182 Gilman v. 
Philadelphia then cited extensively to Gibbons and rejected a riparian 
landowner’s request to enjoin the construction of a bridge built for 
“public convenience” that would affect private property values around 
a navigable river on which coal was transported.183 Subsequently, 
Gibson v. United States upheld the No Compensation Rule in a case 
in which a private property interest was affected when the federal 
government built a dike on a navigable river.184 There, the Supreme 
Court held that “riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to 
suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the 
exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that regard.”185 
Indeed, more recent cases have upheld this insight and have stated that 
the law is “largely settled.”186 They have held that the public right of 
access to private property under the navigational servitude is subject 
to payment of consideration in some cases.187  
 
720 (6th Cir. 1977); see also Robin Kundis Craig, What the Public Trust Doctrine 
Can Teach Us About the Police Power, Penn Central, and the Public Interest in 
Natural Resource Regulation, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 519, 537 (2015). 
 180. Shafer, supra note 178, at 22; see also 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 
supra note 134, at § 35.02 (discussing New Mexico, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, and 
South Dakota); Rasband, supra note 174, at 361. 
 181. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 35.02. 
 182. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (explaining Congress has 
“the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be 
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prescribed in the constitution”). 
 183. Gilman, 70 U.S. at 720, 732. 
 184. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 272 (1897).  
 185. Id. at 276. 
 186. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177, 180 (1979); see also 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 134, at § 35.02. 
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As Sax observes, “[t]he presence of the navigation servitude 
effectively reduces an owner’s property interest to a usufruct.”188 Like 
the ancient doctrines before it, the navigational servitude thus shows 
that the public aspect may set aside private rights concerns when those 
interfere with the public’s right to navigation. 
3. Navigable Waters 
At the state level, the public dimension of water law is pursued 
in the doctrine of navigable waters. Under English law, the crown 
retained rights to the public lands beneath navigable waters.189 The 
public rights associated with such lands “thereafter belonged to the 
state in trust for the people.”190 Under the doctrine of the equality of 
the states, which holds that each state entered the union on the same 
footing and with the same rights as other states, absent congressional 
expression to the contrary, each state received title to the navigable 
waters within its boundaries, and such waters have since been 
governed by state law.191  
The California constitution and a number of state statutes 
underscore the public aspect of the navigable waters doctrine.192 
Article 10, Section 4, of the California state constitution provides that 
private owners of navigable waters may not exclude access to such 
water “whenever it is required for any public purpose,” that “free 
navigation” is not to be impeded, and that the legislature must “give 
the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the 
navigable waters of this State shall always be attainable for the people 
thereof.”193 The California Harbor and Navigation Code provides that 
“[n]avigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport 
the products of the country are public ways for the purposes of 
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navigation and of such transportation.”194 The California Public 
Resources Code prohibits the sale, lease, or rental of public lands 
abutting navigable waterways that are otherwise inaccessible without 
reserving a public easement “to the people of the State.”195 The 
California Public Resources Code also grants the state commission 
“exclusive jurisdiction over all . . . of the beds of navigable rivers, 
streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, inlets, and straits.”196 The California 
Health and Safety Code prohibits the placement, depositing, or 
dumping of any garbage “in or upon the navigable waters of this 
state.”197 California thus upholds the public dimension of its navigable 
waters, further showing the range of rights the people of the state enjoy 
in the area of water rights. Significantly, the public trust doctrine 
governs the navigable waters of the state.198 
Therefore, a number of water law doctrines, from the public trust 
doctrine to the navigability and navigable waters doctrines, underscore 
the public limitation impressed on each usufructuary water right and 
the public’s dominant right over such a water right.   
E. States’ Police Power  
Implicit in states’ exercise of their power to overlay a water right 
with a public dimension is the general discretion states enjoy in 
environmental matters. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
upheld states’ police power to protect their environmental interests.199 
As early as 1907, Justice Holmes held for the majority in Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper that an aggrieved state could, as a quasi-sovereign, 
obtain an injunction to prevent a private party in an adjoining state 
from emitting noxious pollutants into its territory, where the pollutant 
destroyed crops, forests, and orchards.200 The injunction issued even if 
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the state’s ownership of the affected land was negligible and thus its 
own economic losses were negligible.201 Such a result was permissible 
because as a quasi-sovereign: 
the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, 
in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether 
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air. It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that 
word, but with it remains the final power.202 
Tennessee Copper’s recognition of a quasi-sovereign’s ability to 
protect its public interests was taken up in the seminal climate change 
case, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, where 
Justice Stevens relied on the language above to hold for the majority 
that states had Article III standing to challenge federal regulatory 
actions affecting their environmental interests.203  
Almost a year after Tennessee Copper, Justice Holmes held 
again for the majority that, as a quasi-sovereign, a state’s police power 
over its rivers could defeat the constitutional due process and 
contractual rights claims, among others, brought by a riparian 
landowner within the state wishing to transport water out of the state 
in violation of a statute.204 That case, Hudson County Water Co. v. 
McCarter, allowed Justice Holmes to mirror the public interest 
insights he offered in Tennessee Copper: 
[I]t appears to us that few public interests are more obvious, indisputable 
and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a state 
to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, 
except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may 
permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public 
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing 
as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private 
property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots.205 
Tennessee Copper and Hudson County can thus be read to indicate 
that, as a quasi-sovereign acting in the public interest, the state enjoys 
constitutional protection in the exercise of its police power regarding 
certain environmental interests, as against competing constitutional 
and private property claims. In other words, private assertions of 
property rights in such cases are overlaid with a veneer of public 
 
 201. See id.  
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limitation on which a state may rely to intervene in specific cases, 
subject, in certain cases, to payment of compensation.206 As a recent 
California water rights case noted, “[a]ll water rights [in the state], 
even riparian and pre-1914 rights, are subject to the police powers of 
the state.”207 
I now turn to what a state like California should do, in a moment 
of public emergency, as it relies on such doctrines.  
II. WATER AND PUBLIC EMERGENCIES 
Here, I begin by proposing a constitutional amendment that 
would make explicit the public’s ownership of water, which would 
allow the public to regulate uses of its property. Just in case the 
constitutional amendment fails, a legislative enactment is proposed. 
While similar arguments have been made by other commentators, this 
Part expands upon their insights, and it considers how such proposals 
might have helped in determining the outcome of the California 
drought case with which I began the Article.  
A. California’s Problem 
Here, I focus on the specific water-rights case that arose during 
the longest drought in California’s history—the case with which I 
began the Article. The case not only dramatizes the role of the State 
Water Board in a public emergency, but it also permits the application 
of the concepts that I have explored in the Article so far. I begin with 
an overview of the State Water Board’s statutory power and function, 
its response during the public emergency—that is, a drought—and 
conclude with the constitutional and statutory responses that address 
the public nature of a usufructuary water right. As indicated in the 
introduction, very similar arguments have been made by other 
commentators.208 Here, I expand upon their insights with a recent case 
in mind.  
Established in 1913 to oversee the State’s water resources and to 
permit the use of water, the State Water Board has seen its powers 
grow to encompass the supervision of reasonable use of water in 
 
 206. See generally James M. Olson, Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: 
Water, Public Trust, and International Trade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1103 (2006) (discussing the public limitation on property rights).   
 207. Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, No. 2015-1-CV-285182, slip op. at 8 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2018).  
 208. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 When Should Water Belong to the Public? 1425 
California, as well as action in the public interest.209 Its enabling statute 
mandates the “efficient administration” of waters in the state, 
including the exercise of related “adjudicatory and regulatory” 
functions.”210 Since its work is also quantitative, involving the 
identification of the amount of water available for appropriation and 
the determination of who has superior rights to available water, its 
enforcement function is limited.211 The Board is empowered to prevent 
waste of the state’s water resources.212 When determining the order of 
priority in water-rights matters, the State Water Board’s 
determinations are subject to the Superior Court’s approval.213  
The longest drought in California’s history led to a gubernatorial 
“command” that the State Water Board “put water right holders 
throughout the state on notice that they may be directed to cease or 
reduce water diversions based on water shortages.”214 Following the 
directive, the State Water Board issued an informational notice of 
water shortages and of potential curtailments, which it followed with 
another document alerting rights-holders to possible water 
curtailments.215 Subsequent legislation empowered the water agency 
“to require curtailment of diversions when water is not available under 
the diverter’s priority of right,” and the legislation required reporting 
of water use or the drafting of reports.216 The governor announced a 
continuing state of emergency and empowered the State Water Board 
to take the necessary steps to conserve water in the state, consistent 
with the law.217 Carving out exceptions for power generation and 
health and safety, the water agency curtailed water use for all post-
1914 rights-holders, and indicated it might curtail older water rights 
as well.218  
Fearing non-compliance and its effects on senior rights-holders, 
the State Water Board then adopted emergency regulations that cited 
to relevant statutory authority and allowed the water agency to act 
during the drought, including the issuance of curtailment notices.219 
 
 209. Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, slip op. at 8–9.  
 210. Id. at 9. 
 211. See id. at 9–10. 
 212. See id. at 10.  
 213. See id.  
 214. Id. at 11.  
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. at 12. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. at 13; In re Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Co., No. WR 2014-
0028, 2014 Cal. ENV LEXIS 148, at *58 (Sept. 23, 2014) (“For the purposes of 
1426 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
Over nine thousand curtailment notices were issued before the 
emergency regulations permitting the curtailments subsequently 
expired, and an executive order by the governor regarding drought 
conditions and the water agency’s role in addressing those conditions 
followed.220 Without the cover of the (expired) emergency regulations, 
the State Water Board issued more curtailment notices requiring 
cessation of diversion of water, subject to penalties for non-
compliance.221 Irrigation districts affected by the notices asked the 
water agency to reconsider, and lawsuits followed. The Superior Court 
held that the Board lacked jurisdiction to curtail water rights without 
clear legislative authority and that the State Water Board violated the 
petitioners’ due process rights.222 
California’s problem, or part of its “curse,” is that it is prone to 
recurring droughts, which will result in further emergency conditions 
that require a response from the executive and the judicial branches.223 
California has experienced multi-year droughts of varying durations 
roughly six times over the past half century.224 How, therefore, might 
the state’s water agency effectively rely on the powerful line of water 
law doctrines reaching back to antiquity that underscore the public 
nature of a usufructuary water right? 
Thus far, the State Water Board appears to rely mainly on its 
statutory authority and on gubernatorial cover, in the form of 
executive orders, before it acts in the public interest during a drought 
emergency. That makes sense, since the water agency must anticipate 
lawsuits from private rights-holders who may have political influence, 
and who have already succeeded in a case challenging the agency’s 
curtailment orders during a moment of dire public emergency.225 Since 
its members are appointed by the governor and are “confirmed by the 
 
adopting emergency regulations under Water Code section 1058.5, an emergency 
regulation is appropriate during specified dry years, or when the Governor has 
declared a drought state of emergency. This statute also clearly establishes that 
emergency regulations to adopt waste and unreasonable use regulations are an 
appropriate response to those conditions.”).  
 220. Cal. Water Curtailment Cases, slip op. at 14–15; see also In re Rickland 
E. Vicini, No. WR 2015-0040-DWR, 2015 Cal. ENV LEXIS 43, at *8 (Nov. 3, 2015).  
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Senate[, and they] run the State Water Board,” the agency may also 
fear political pressure.226 The agency further lacks the funding and 
resources it needs.227 Thus, when the governor provides it with the 
cover it needs, it is likely emboldened to act in the public interest—
but as narrowly as possible, given the constraints it faces.  
And yet, at least since the foundational National Audubon 
opinion, the State Water Board has had the public trust as a legal tool 
available to it. A study of the State Water Board’s decisions and orders 
between 1984 and 2010 by Dave Owen found that “[i]n approximately 
half of its decisions and approximately eight percent of its orders, the 
Board cites the public trust doctrine as a basis for environmentally 
protective restrictions on water use.”228 Significantly, the State Water 
Board almost never relies on the public trust doctrine alone, but 
appeals to statutory authority in concert because “[t]he doctrine is 
thoroughly integrated into the state’s statutory and administrative 
environmental law system, and has accomplished little outside of 
it.”229 As such, the public trust doctrine is a “factor,” a reason among 
many, on which the State Water Board relies to protect the 
environment.230 On its own, the public trust doctrine is hardly 
“transformative,” and it has “little discernable importance.”231 Indeed, 
since National Audubon is open to interpretation regarding the scope 
of the agency’s trust duty, the State Water Board may also fear 
exceeding its grant of power since the public trust doctrine and the 
emphatic opinion giving rise to it have caused controversy.232 What, 
therefore, might be done under the circumstances? 
B. Solutions 
A few responses are possible. Given the likelihood of further 
droughts, and the foreseeable necessity of a raft of future measures to 
forestall the strain on the state’s water resources caused by another 
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natural emergency, measures could now be taken into consideration.233 
Such measures need legislative input, given the limitations under 
which the State Water Board labors and the likelihood of fierce 
opposition by water rights-holders offended that their property rights 
are being infringed upon by the regulatory state.234  
Here, I first look at a possible amendment to the California 
constitution before turning to a legislative solution that might help the 
State Water Board during the next environmental emergency, such as 
a prolonged and devastating drought.  
1. Constitutional Amendment 
At least one commentator has argued that the state constitution 
should be amended to respond specifically to water shortages. Such a 
constitutional amendment to Article X, Section 2, of the California 
constitution would underscore the state’s “legal police power to take 
back all types of private water use rights, including but not limited to 
[existing water] rights . . . in times of water shortage or at any time the 
State determines that water in the State is not being put to beneficial 
and reasonable use.”235 The proposal is indeed important, insofar as it 
address a gap in the state constitution, which appears to not have any 
provisions addressing drought, water shortages, or a similar 
environmental emergency.236 The proposed amendment is unlikely to 
pass, however, if it makes it to the ballot for electoral ratification, 
given its strong language that would “take back all types of private 
water use rights.”237 That is, the principle underlying the proposed 
constitutional amendment is sound and laudable—water does belong 
to the public—but the proposed amendment is problematic since it 
comes across as a state grab of private property.  
A more acceptable proposal might explicitly identify the various 
rights of the stakeholders when it comes to water rights but make the 
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usufructuary nature of a water right much clearer. The language of 
such a constitutional amendment—not a revision—could borrow from 
proposed changes to constitutions in other states.238 Colorado, for 
example, considered a constitutional amendment that would have 
made the usufructuary nature of water quite explicit, as well as the 
public’s interest in maintaining its interest in its property, whose use 
it confers upon private citizens. As the language of the proposed 
amendment provided: “THE USE OF WATER IS A USUFRUCT PROPERTY 
RIGHT, GRANTED BY THE PUBLIC TO WATER USERS, THAT SHALL 
REQUIRE THE WATER USE APPROPRIATOR TO RETURN WATER 
UNIMPAIRED TO THE PUBLIC, AFTER USE, SO AS TO PROTECT THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE PUBLIC’S USE AND ENJOYMENT OF 
WATERS.”239 I would include in the amendment language specifically 
providing that “[u]sufruct rights are thus the property of the people of 
California, and such rights are subject to regulation by the people’s 
representatives, especially in periods of public necessity or public 
emergency.”  
Such language might seem redundant if water already belongs to 
the public, but redundancy may be just what’s needed to uphold the 
public’s ancient right to its waters. As discussed above, California’s 
Water Code already makes “[a]ll water within the State . . . the 
property of the people of the State,” subject to appropriation.240 
California’s constitution itself provides for “public use” of 
appropriated water “subject to the regulation and control of the State, 
in the manner to be prescribed by law.”241 The proposed amendment 
would, thus, have the added benefit of implicitly making clear what 
res publicae, res communes, publici juris, the state’s police power, the 
public trust doctrine, the federal navigation servitude, and the state 
navigable waters doctrines all show: water rights are limited property 
rights granted by the public to the usufructuary, and the public may 
act in the broader interest, especially during a moment of public 
emergency.  
A number of objections will no doubt be raised. First, if the 
public nature of water rights is already clear, which is open to 
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contestation, then why be duplicative? That is, there is no need to 
make even more explicit what is allegedly clear from the doctrines as 
they stand, especially in California, which has been aggressive in its 
expansion of the public’s role in environmental and water rights.242 
The problem with this objection is that it overlooks the fact that 
agencies like the State Water Board depend on abundantly clear grants 
of power, and, in their absence, they are constrained, which is further 
exacerbated by a lack of funding needed to fully discharge their duties 
to the public.243 The constitutional amendment would, thus, bolster the 
water agency’s legal position and its political clout to act on the 
public’s behalf, which are important when it deals with very 
contentious water-rights issues.  
It might further be contended that the state constitution is already 
filled with unnecessary bloat, due in no small part to changes that have 
made it “[e]ight times the length of the U.S. Constitution” such that it 
is now filled with “obfuscation, clutter and dysfunction.”244 In sum, the 
state constitution is “an embarrassment for an otherwise cutting-edge 
state,” and an additional change would merely underscore the 
dysfunction and prolong the embarrassment of the people of 
California.245 A response to this objection would be that the 
amendment is a direct response to the embarrassing situation in which 
the State Water Board (and thus the people of California) already find 
themselves during a public emergency—hamstrung and, thus, unable 
to move decisively in the public interest. The proposed measure is 
clear enough, and it simply makes explicit what courts have long 
drawn from the history of water rights laws.246  
Amendments to the California constitution happen in one of two 
ways. The first is through the legislative calling of a constitutional 
convention by a two thirds majority before sending the amendment for 
ratification to the electorate.247 The second is via a ballot initiative.248 
The more viable option, as a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in a law-review article dealing 
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with a different topic entirely, is likely by ballot initiative because 
“[o]nly in California and Colorado is it harder to amend the state’s 
constitution through legislative action than to amend by direct voter 
initiative.”249 Californians thus favor constitutional amendments 
effected through ballot initiatives.250 The proposed amendment 
regarding the public nature of water is, therefore, more likely to pass 
via a ballot initiative.  
2. Legislative Change 
Commentators have further identified two changes that should 
be made at the legislative level. First, additional funding should be 
allocated to the State Water Board, and second, private water rights 
should be “reclaimed.”251 Funding would specifically allow the State 
Water Board to face the eventualities of climate change and allow the 
agency to live up to its charge to uphold the public trust doctrine.252 
While I remain less certain about the “reclamation” of private water 
rights, since the public is already the owner, and it has chosen to 
bestow the water’s usufruct on private citizens, should a constitutional 
amendment seem imprudent for whatever reason, then the language of 
the proposed amendment might be codified in a statute. Again, similar 
language already exists at the statutory level, and the codification of 
the usufructuary nature of a water right would only clarify its nature. 
Indeed, such language would draw on similar language in California’s 
laws.  
CONCLUSION 
The question posed in the title of the Article is thus a little 
misleading—intentionally so. Water already belongs to the public, and 
private rights-holders are mere usufructuaries who enjoy a limited 
grant of property-use rights because the public believes it in its own 
interest that they do so. From res communes to navigability doctrines, 
a variety of water-rights doctrines underscore the limited nature of the 
use right. Such doctrines are the legal tools that the public has 
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fashioned for itself, through its judicial systems over many centuries, 
to guarantee that the public’s continued interest in water is both 
recognized and upheld.  
The public’s interest is, thus, quite likely most imperiled during 
an environmental emergency like a devastating drought. The public’s 
servants should be empowered with all the tools they need not only to 
protect the public during such an emergency but also the public’s 
interest in its own property whose use it has, for a time, permitted 
private citizens to put to reasonable and beneficial use, consistent with 
relevant laws. The usufructuaries’ right should, thus, in no way 
prevent the public’s superior claim to the regulation of its property and 
to the imposition of restrictions on the use of such property, cognizant, 
of course, of the limitations of federal and state laws, such as the 
payment of just compensation, as required by law, in appropriate 
cases.  
Simply put, water belongs to the public, and the public’s claim 
should be treated as more emphatic during periods of public 
emergency. This Article’s normative dimension, the should in the 
question it poses—When Should Water Belong to the Public?—thus 
implies the existence of a condition that reinforces the public’s claim 
to its own property. That is, the public’s claim to its property is 
heightened in moments of environmental necessity, and its claim 
should be treated as strongest in such cases.  
California is prone to droughts, and it will likely encounter more 
damaging droughts and other environmental challenges in the future. 
The tools urged upon the legislature, the courts, and the people in this 
Article are means of facing some of the challenges ahead. When using 
the tools suggested here, they need only recall the nature of the 
relationship between the public as the dominant property rights-holder 
and the usufructuary as the holder of a subordinate property interest. 
As holders of the superior property interest, the people or public of 
California own the water, and their representatives should be 
empowered, especially during public emergencies, to act on their 
behalf.   
 
